USA v. Akiba Mercer by unknown
2008 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-20-2008 
USA v. Akiba Mercer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Akiba Mercer" (2008). 2008 Decisions. 636. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/636 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
CLD-255 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-1764
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AKIBA A. MERCER, 
                                            Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Crim. No. 04-cr-00135-001)
District Judge:  Honorable James F. McClure, Jr. 
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 17, 2008
Before: AMBRO, FUENTES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 20, 2008)
_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Akiba A. Mercer, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the
District Court’s order dismissing his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or
correct his sentence.  For the following reasons, we will summarily vacate the District
2Court’s order and remand the matter to the District Court. 
In 2005, a jury in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania found Mercer guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and related offenses.  
The District Court subsequently sentenced Mercer to 52 months’ imprisonment.  This
Court affirmed the sentence on direct appeal.   
On November 15, 2007, Mercer filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate,
set aside, or correct his sentence.  In his motion and accompanying memorandum of law,
Mercer alleged that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assistance by: (a) failing to
move to suppress the evidence recovered from Mercer’s apartment and failing to challenge
its admission at trial; (b) failing to show that the prosecution had bribed its witnesses; (c)
failing to “properly investigate any avenues of defense”; and (d) failing to contact any
defense witnesses.  Mercer also alleged that the prosecution had destroyed evidence,
bribed witnesses by agreeing to overlook potential possession charges, and relied on
tainted lab tests to convict him.  Lastly, Mercer asserted a claim for “structural error,” in
which he essentially repeated the allegations of his ineffective assistance and prosecutorial
misconduct claims.  
On November 21, 2007, the District Court issued an order pursuant to United States
v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644 (3d Cir. 1999), directing Mercer to confirm that he wished to
pursue relief by way of § 2255.  In response, Mercer wrote a letter to the District Court
indicating that he would not be filing the Notice of Election.  As a result, the District Court
    We granted Marcer’s request for a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether1
the District Court erred in summarily dismissing Appellant’s § 2255 motion for failure to
plead sufficient facts, and issued an order directing the government to show cause why
the District Court’s order should not be summarily vacated.  We have considered the
government’s argument opposing a summary remand.
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attempted to proceed with his motion as filed, but determined that it did not contain
enough factual support to allow the government to respond.  Therefore, prior to effecting
service, the court directed Mercer to amend his motion to provide supporting facts.  The
court warned Mercer that failure to do so by January 5, 2008, might result in dismissal 
without any further investigation.  Mercer did not amend his motion.  As a result, by order
entered January 14, 2008, the District Court summarily dismissed the motion without
serving it on the government.  The present appeal followed.  1
Upon review, we find that the District Court abused its discretion in summarily
dismissing Mercer’s § 2255 motion for failure to plead sufficient facts.  Rule 4(b) of the
rules governing motions filed pursuant to § 2255 requires a district judge to summarily
dismiss a § 2255 motion “[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any attached exhibits,
and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief.”  Fed. R.
§ 2255 Proceedings 4(b).  Although Rule 4(b) permits the district court to dispose of
“vague and conclusory allegations” contained in a § 2255 motion without further
investigation, United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 437 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v.
Dawson, 857 F.2d 923, 928 (3d Cir. 1988), here, Mercer set forth sufficient facts to avoid
summary dismissal.  While some of Mercer’s grounds may be too vague and conclusory to
warrant further investigation—for instance, his claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to “properly investigate any avenues of defense”—other claims, such as the claim
that counsel failed to move to suppress the drugs and failed to contact the owners of the
building, present issues upon which the District Court could have proceeded. 
Furthermore, some of Mercer’s other claims, such as the claim that the prosecution had
bribed Yians and Hart, are not the type of claims that Mercer could realistically support at
this stage of the proceedings; while Mercer may well fail to meet his burden of proof on
these claims, he alleged sufficient facts to withstand summary dismissal.  
Therefore, we believe that the District Court should consider anew the various
grounds for relief, and dismiss only those grounds that are truly vague and conclusory. 
See Thomas, 221 F.3d at 437 (holding that the district court abused its discretion by
summarily dismissing all 26 grounds in a § 2255 motion, where only certain claims were
vague and conclusory).  Accordingly, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s
dismissal order and remand the matter with instructions to the District Court to serve
Escobar’s motion as provided by Rule 4(b) of the rules governing motions filed pursuant
to § 2255.  
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